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Unexpected results on democratic processes (e.g. Brexit referendum, US and Greek elections) have 
brought discussion on populism to the forefront of the global agenda. Although the phenomenon is 
not new (Zaslove 2008), its present manifestation is understood as a sharpening of antagonistic 
relations in present-day Western societies (Hawkins et al. 2016). Populism is consensually defined as 
a division of social and political spaces into opposing groups, ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ (Canovan 
1999; Laclau 2007; Žižek 2006) but theory and research on populism often examines the populist 
modus operandi (at least) in two competing ways. For some, populism is caused by a combination of  
charismatic leadership, sophisticated party machinery and propaganda (Mudde 2010). Thus, 
populism is here understood as an ideology that “displaces the antagonism and constructs the 
enemy (…) whose annihilation would restore balance and justice” (Žižek 2006, 555). For others, 
present forms of populism appear to be a reaction among those feeling economic, cultural and 
political vulnerability in relation to globalization and exclusionary economic and political structures 
(Spruyt et al. 2016). Here, populism is understood as ‘the essence of politics’, a potential ‘cure’ to 
present democratic deficits (Laclau 2007; Martinelli 2016). By contrasting Slavoj Žižek’s (1989; 2006) 
recent works on philosophy and psychoanalysis with work in the area of ‘radical democracy’ (Laclau 
2007a; 2007b; 2014; Mouffe 2009; Rancière, 1999, 2006), this article discusses these two different 
understandings of populism and the educational implications deriving from each.  
We take as a starting point for this discussion three shared assumptions that, in our understanding, 
underlie both Žižek’s work on populism and the perspective from radical democracy, as found in the 
work of Laclau, Mouffe and Rancière. First, in contrast with those who describe populism as a 
demagogical form of politics, we understand populism, along with Pollock et al. (2015), as 
“legitimate political positions within a pluralist discourse” (143).  Populism is here considered to be 
no more or less demagogical – or not necessarily so - than other forms of politics. Second, populism 
lacks any clear world-view or belief system (Canovan, 1999). Thus, it is not surprising that both left 
and right-wing forms of populism coexist in present-day Western societies (Inglehart & Norris 2016). 
Third, ‘the people’ is always constructed against an Other, often defined as ‘the elite’ or the 
‘established power’ (Canovan 1999; Laclau 2007). There are multiple examples of this in recent 
populist discourses. As discussed by Inglehart and Norris (2016), “despite being located on opposite 
sides of the aisle, Trump’s rhetoric taps into some of the same populist anti-elite anger articulated 
by Bernie Sanders when attacking big corporations, big donors, and big banks” (5). In Europe, the 
populist rhetoric has often challenged the project of European Integration. Whilst the most well-
known case is the Brexit Referendum in the UK, a number of populist leaders have promised to hold a 
referendum on EU membership (Martinelli 2016).  
This article is structured as follows. We first examine the notion of populism in relation to Žižek’s 
work, then in relation to work from the perspective of ‘radical democracy’ (Little and Lloyd, 2009), 
characterised by a concern for the expansion of the public sphere and a reconignition of the positive 
dynamics of conflict, dissensus and plurality. Here, we draw principally on the work of Laclau, 
Mouffe and Rancière. We then identify the main differences of the political project deriving from 
these two understandings. We argue that one of the sharpest points of difference between the two 
perspectives – and therefore one of the most illuminating for thinking through the challenge of 
populism – is in their conception of what constitutes the political terrain. We conclude by 
emphasising some of the educational implications of these two understandings , particularly with 
regards to the role of the educator. Whilst motivated by a shared concern for social justice, 
educators’ approaches to the challenge of populism – both for them and their students - are likely to 
be very different depending on how populism, and politics, this is understood.   
First perspective: Populism as an ideological narrative 
The work of Žižek (1989, 1992, 2006) provides a first theoretical framework for assessing the nature 
of populist movements. In Žižek’s words, an ideology—as a symbolic construct, a “social fantasy” 
(Žižek 1992, 142)—is always a necessary counterpart to some real antagonism. Ideology is precisely 
the way the antagonistic fissure is masked (Žižek 1992, 142). It is our purpose here to deploy Žižek’s 
theoretical tools to briefly examine how populism can be understood as a “social fantasy”.  
Within the Žižekian field, social antagonism is irreducible, that is, there is always something 
thwarting the establishment of a completely orderly society. Every identity, including ‘the people’, is 
sustained by an inherent antagonism, a deadlock preventing its full actualisation.  The question then 
arises of how to make sense, how to symbolise such an antagonism – which kind of symbolisation is 
built to give meaning to what is seen as corroding the social structure? 
According to Žižek (1989, 140-144), it is by displacing our own inherent antagonisms onto an alien or 
foreigner Other, that we are able to conceal them:  
“In populism, the enemy is externalized or reified into a positive ontological entity (even 
if this entity is spectral) whose annihilation would restore balance and justice; 
symmetrically, our own—the populist political agent’s—identity is also perceived as pre-
existing the enemy’s onslaught” (Žižek 2006, 555).  
This creates a fantasy of unity, where eventual antagonisms within society are disavowed and 
transposed onto the Other as the source of antagonism. The populists, in Žižek’s words, 
“refuse to confront the complexity of the situation, to reduce it to a clear struggle with a 
pseudoconcrete enemy figure (from Brussels bureaucracy to illegal immigrants). 
Populism is thus by definition a negative phenomenon, a phenomenon grounded in a 
refusal, even an implicit admission of impotence” (2006, 576).  
In the UK, the ‘BREXIT’ movement has been defined as a populist movement (Inglehart & Norris, 
2016). Brexiters have externalized some inherent problems within the British society (e.g. large 
equality gap, the failure of the National Health System) into an external ‘entity’, the European Union. 
The UK is not an isolated case. Other European populist movements have followed similar paths. In 
France, for instance, Marine Le Pen had promised to hold a referendum on EU membership if she won 
the presidential elections. In all these cases, the European Union (on other occasions, migrants might 
play a similar role) is presented as an intruder whose elimination would enable us to restore order, 
stability and identity (to paraphrase Žižek, 1989, p. 144). 
A particular entity assumes the role of the force of corruption, which, once eliminated, will allow the 
full actualisation of the oppressed identity. However, if, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have shown, 
“society doesn’t exist”, that the field of the social is always an inconsistent field structured around a 
constitutive antagonism or impossibility, then this ideological mechanism of allocating the source of 
evil to an external cause can be seen as an ideological fantasy (Žižek 1989, 142), whose function is to 
mask this inconsistency, the fact that “society doesn’t exist”. In other words, an ideological narrative 
is built that allows for members of a social group to perceive as external, something that is 
inherently out of joint. Such is the typical mode of an ideological formation.  
The move that Žižek suggests as a way of breaking with this logic of identification is what Lacan 
named, “traversing the fantasy”: to recognise that the properties attributed by populists to the 
European bureaucracy or to illegal immigrants is not something external to the system but an 
inherent part of the system itself.  The current capitalist economy produces, as part of its own 
workings, impoverished masses, massive migrant dislocations and, ultimately, terror. The disavowal 
mechanism that consists in allocating the cause of these problems to well-defined identities 
(migrants, Muslims, Southern and Eastern Europeans, etc.) ends up performing a very important 
ideological task: it inhibits us from approaching the problem from the universal position that capital 
occupies today.  
Second perspective: Populism from the viewpoint of radical democracy 
For Mouffe and Laclau, as for Žižek, antagonism is at the basis of the social fabric. However, in 
contrast with Žižek, for whom there is a “fundamental social antagonism”, the “class struggle, that 
divides the social edifice from within”1 (Žižek 2000, 124), for Laclau and Mouffe, no form of 
antagonism is pre-determined. More theoretically, “there is no overlap between the ontic and the 
ontological orders” (Laclau 2014, p. 5). Society is ontologically framed by antagonistic relations but 
none of these relations is ‘inherent’ to the system. Rather, the system itself is created through 
antagonistic relations that, simultaneously, need to be discursively constructed. Mouffe writes, 
“political practice cannot be envisaged as simply representing the interest of preconstitued identities 
but as constituting these identities themselves in a precarious and always vulnerable terrain” (2009, 
99-100). Each system is defined by a ‘we’ and an Other and all ‘we(s)’ and all ‘Other(s)’ need to be 
(politically and discursively) constructed.  
‘The people’, in Laclau’s work, appeals to universality and aims at the achievement of social fullness, 
but ‘the people’ does not have any content of its own. ‘The people’ operates as an ‘empty signifier’ 
the meaning of which is defined by situated discourses (Laclau 2007a). Particular discourses are here 
understood as responses to specific problems. But a particular discourse, in a process of 
hegemonization, “overflows its own particularity and becomes the incarnation of the absent fullness 
of society” (Laclau 2007b, 72). The particular discourse becomes the hegemonic discourse of ‘the 
people’ in such a way that it is understood as giving response to different dissatisfactions generated 
by the existing order. This is precisely the power of ‘the people’.  
                                                             
1 The notion of ‘class struggle’ in Žižek’s work is often matter of debate (Žižek 2006; Laclau 2014). In 
this paper, we understand that, for  Žižek, ‘class struggle’ is not to be confused with two positive 
entities— workers and capitalists—struggling against each other. Instead it designates the very 
antagonism that prevents the objective (social) reality from constituting itself as a self -enclosed whole 
(Žižek, 1994). As expressed by Žižek (1994): “The question of the suitability of the term ‘class struggle’ 
to designate today’s dominant form of antagonism is secondary here, it concerns concrete social 
analysis; what matters is that the very constitution of social reality involves the ‘primordial repression’ 
of an antagonism” (p. 25). 
Let us examine this in relation to present forms of populism in Western societies. Political scientists 
associate the rise of populism to economic, political and cultural challenges. In a context of multiple 
sovereignties (Brown, 2014), the incapacity of national governments to implement effective policies 
together with the crisis of the traditional parties have generated a crisis of representative 
democracies (Martinelli, 2016). Simultaneously, the processes of deterritorialization (Appadurai, 
1990) and the 2008 economic crisis have accentuated the polarization (cultural and economic) of 
Western societies among the ruling economic/cosmopolitan elites, the “ethnic folk” and the migrant 
other (Friedman, 2015). Those who align themselves with populist discourses, often described as the 
“losers of globalization” or “losers of modernization” (Martinelli, 2016) are united by their 
dissatisfaction. In relation to recent events, Mouffe explained in an interview,  
“In France, the majority of the working class is voting for Marine Le Pen. It’s easy to 
understand, because these sectors have become the losers in globalization. Le Pen has 
been able to articulate—in a xenophobic vocabulary—the demands of the popular 
classes. They are democratic demands. They are ordinary people who are suffering. But 
Le Pen comes with the discourse: “I understand that you are suffering. The people who 
are responsible are the immigrants.” She is establishing a frontier against immigrants. Le 
Pen says that she cares about the people while the French Socialist Party—like Clinton—
has no discourse about people’s genuine problems with the status quo.   People don’t 
trust the establishment leaders and parties anymore. They no longer convince. It seems 
to me that this is what Sanders was trying to do. He was giving another answer. The 
adversary is not immigrants, but it’s Wall Street and financial interests. This is left-wing 
populism.” (Mouffe and Shahid December 2016).  
 
In Mouffe’s account, “ordinary people” are suffering in contemporary Western societies. This 
suffering is not only assumed to be part of the human condition but also a result of a political order 
that does not give response to the economic, political and cultural challenges previously mentioned. 
Individuals might have different demands in relation to these challenges but the populist discourse 
might give answers to them all. In this context, populism becomes a clear alternative to the 
“establishment leaders and parties”.  
But ‘the people’ is disputed by (at least) two competing discourses. On one end, right-wing forms of 
populism including Marine Le Pen, Trump, Wilders and others aspire to define a system constructed 
through antagonistic relations between ‘the people’ and an Other which is defined in relation to 
‘immigrants’ and the establishment leaders who have allowed this immigration to happen. But on 
the other end, there are competing forms of populism. For Sanders, Podemos and SYRIZA among 
others, ‘the people’ is not constructed against ‘the immigrants’, but against the “establishment 
leaders and parties” and “Wall Street and financial interests”. An attempt, on both ends, right-wing 
and left-wing, to ‘hegemonize’ ‘the people’ and to define a new system. ‘The people’, as a  signifier, 
can be interrupted by competing discourses defining different relations between the we and the 
Other. The populist competition responds to what Gramsci defines as a “war of positions”, “strictly 
speaking a logic of displacement of political frontiers” (Laclau 2007a, 153). 
Something akin to this, “logic of displacement of political frontiers” finds expression in Rancière’s 
(1999, 2004, 2006) work as the constant but irresolvable struggle between the ‘police’ and ‘politics’. 
For Rancière, there exists both a ‘police’ logic that seeks to delineate society neatly (thus muting the 
equality that exists in all political systems since the original democratic rupture in Athens) and a logic 
of ‘politics’ that seeks to disrupt such delineations (thus exposing their contingency, and highlighting 
the equality inherent within them. These two logics are opposed and constantly in tension with each 
other. Those moments in which ‘politics’ (always democratic politics for Rancière) ‘breaks through’ 
and ruptures the political status quo result in a reconfiguration of the current delineation of society; 
they leave their traces in a reconfigured political order. For Rancière, genuine politics always 
involves a claim to equality, which can also be seen as an instantiation of ‘the people’. His reference 
to the civil rights movement in the USA provides a helpful illustration: 
The young black woman of Montgomery, Alabama, who, one day in December 1955, 
decided to remain in her seat on the bus, which was not hers, in this way decided that she 
had, as a citizen of the United States, the rights she did not have as an inhabitant of a state 
that banned the use of such seats to individuals with one-sixteenth or more parts of 'non-
Caucasian' blood.   And the Blacks of Montgomery who, a propos of this conflict between a 
private person and a transportation company, decided to boycott the company, really acted 
politically, staging the double relation of exclusion and inclusion inscribed in the duality of 
the human being and the citizen.' (Rancière 2006, 57). 
One significant point to draw from the quotation above is that the civil rights movement cannot be 
seen as a case of identity politics or the articulation of a particular set of interests within the public 
sphere. Rather, it was a claim to universality, which at the same time, also took the form of a very 
material and situated struggle against a particular injustice  - one that played on the tensions 
between equality and inequality before the law. What is also interesting in Rancière’s work, from the 
point of view of populism, is that he sees the act of politics as something that is collective but not 
based on any predetermined conception of the community or ‘the people’.  He writes that politics is 
performed by 'uncertain communities that contribute to the formation of enunciative collectives 
that call into question the distribution of roles, territories and languages' and insists that '[a] political 
collective is not, in actual fact, an organism or a communal body' (2004, p. 40).  Such acts are always 
also indeterminate – they may or may not support a reconfiguration of the political status quo along 
more egalitarian lines. Viewed from a Rancierian perspective, populism can be understood 
‘positively’ (from a democratic point of view) if it is aligned within a politics of disruption and 
reconfiguration of the political community in the direction of equality. But it is not necessarily so. 
Populism can also work to support the police logic of a ‘smooth’ political community in which 
everyone and everything has its ‘proper’ (unequal) place.   
Differences in the political project 
 
Besides the three shared assumptions we identified in the introduction , here are differences in the 
way Žižek, on the one hand, and Laclau, Mouffe and Rancière, on the other, understand populism, 
which relate with the  divergent ways in which these authors define ‘the system’ and ‘antagonism’. 
For Žižek, antagonism as such is an inherent part of the Social, a piece of the real that forever resists 
symbolisation, a name for the incompleteness of society. Following Hegel, the obstacles are 
perceived as imposing disorder from the outside and need to be perceived as internal to the same 
system they seem to disrupt. This is the core of Hegelian dialectics:  to posit what at first sight 
appears as external, as an internal feature of the same system that posits it as external. In this sense, 
antagonism is immanent to any society. In the same way, for Laclau and Mouffe, the Social in itself is 
contingent. What we understand as the Social or the social system is nothing else than a space of 
representation that has ‘sedimented’. The difference between the two approaches concerns the way 
antagonism is conceptualised. Whether for Žižek, antagonism is an intrinsic part of the structure, for 
Laclau and Mouffe antagonism is understood as the ‘something’ outside this space of 
representation. It is from this outside position that the possibility of change emerges. The Social 
itself only exists in so far as there is something outside it. But the contingent nature of this ‘outside’ 
matters when defining the nature of the ‘inside’ and therefore the system. Thus, Laclau, Mouffe and 
Žižek agree that any social system is necessarily incomplete. But for Žižek, its incompletion is intrinsic 
to the system, its own inherent limit (the point of extimacy to use Lacan’s neologism). An externality 
that is internal to the system. For Laclau, Mouffe and Rancière, the system in itself is created by this 
externality. The externality can never be assimilated but if the content of this externality does 
indeed change, the system in itself might change.   
 
This difference of approaches has important consequences for how we position ourselves in relation 
to the political. In political terms, if we follow Žižek, emancipation doesn’t come from “outside”, 
from an imagined or alternative community – in itself a very middle class endeavour, of people who 
can actually afford to live alternatively, but by engaging with what we have and changing it from 
within (the state, capitalism, globalisation). It also invites us to put ourselves – enlightened 
academics writing about the faith of the world from our comfortable desks – as part of the problem 
by the way we participate in much of the same reality we desire to change. In this sense, in a move 
akin to populism, academics tend to posit outside of their own practice – in an external entity, being 
it poor teaching, flawed curriculum, governmental pressures, etc. – the reasons for their 
misfortunes. By focusing the attention somewhere else, populism reinforces the same status quo 
which (theoretically) aims to challenge.  
 
On the other hand, if we follow Laclau and Mouffe, emancipation in itself might not exist. 
Emancipation would, at least to a certain extent, imply the movement from a ‘fake’ Social to a ‘real’ 
one in which the universal problem would be solved. And we know that for Laclau and Moufe the 
Social is in itself discursively constructed and no problem is in itself universal but rather a situated 
experience. Laclau and Mouffe, instead, implicitly encourage (all of) us to fight for ‘our’ problems 
whilst we seek alliances with others experiencing similar problems. Only through these alliances, can 
we discursively construct/define the ‘outside’ and the ‘inside’ of the Social system and, in 
consequence, the system itself. If present forms of ‘populist’ politics are important here, it is 
precisely because they challenge the existing frontiers of the system. They position the 
establishment leaders and parties as the ‘Other’ and by doing so, they challenge the status quo. In 
Rancière’s terms, this challenge to the status quo is always instantiated through a specific claim to 
equality and universality by those not only marginalised but rendered invisible as political subjects 
within the given status quo. Their visibility becomes a political act. 
 
In essence, the difference between the two perspectives we have outlined here lies in how each 
understands what constitutes the political terrain. Whilst for Žižek, this terrain is the current, 
capitalist system, for Mouffe, Laclau and Rancière, the political terrain exists both prior to and 
beyond any particular political ‘status quo’ – something which, along with the antagonisms and 
tensions inherent to it, have always to be constructed politically.  As Rancière argues, ”the power of 
the people is always beneath and beyond these [juridico-political] forms” (2006, 54). If populism is a 
displacement of the ‘real’, as something that exists only within an inherently unequal and 
exploitative system, as in Žižek’s thought, then it can never be framed positively. And the question of 
how we respond to populism becomes one of how we recognise our own complicity within the 
attempt to displace ‘real’ economic antagonisms via the construction of a spectral ‘other’. If, 
however, from the perspective of radical democracy, we understand populism as something that 
marks a rupture with the current political status quo, exposing its precarity and contingency, both of 
which are equally ‘real’, then populism can be a positive and vital force for political change. For 
Žižek, this positive force is the force of the negative.  
 
Implications of both approaches for education 
These different approaches have important educational implications. If we understand populism 
through the lens of radical democracy, the links between education and populism are seen as 
simultaneously more powerful and risky. The work of Laclau, Mouffe and Rancière suggests a more 
positive standpoint, one in which teachers and students do more than teaching or studying. They 
open up the discussion not only to the exposure of ideology but also to the possibilities of agency. 
Educational settings such as schools and universities can become one (among other) political 
settings where the struggle to define the ‘lack’ takes place. Settings where teachers and students 
participate in the political act of constructing themselves as teachers, students and as ‘the people’. 
In other words, where ‘the people’ and the ‘Other’ are not only reproduced but also produced 
(Szkudlarek, 2011). Where possibilities to create alliances that define the ‘insiders’ and the 
‘outsiders’ exist. Where educators and students can discuss whether Wall street, or the immigrants, 
to use Mouffe’s example, are behind our problems. This would approach what Biesta (2006) has 
argued is the vital work of democratic education - both in providing political spaces of disagreement, 
and in encouraging students to learn from those moments in which they have had the opportunity 
(or not) to act politically in the world.   But “opening education up to the elements of populism could 
therefore be an opening for affects and demands that are not directed towards a democratic life” 
(Mårdh & Tryggvason, 2017). Educational settings (and other political settings) become spaces 
where ‘the people’ and the Other can be defined in terms we might not all agree with. Where some 
of our students, or even ourselves as part of what is sometimes defined as the ‘cultural elite’ are 
constructed as the other. The challenge for education here becomes the same question as for 
politics; a change in the status quo is not necessarily a change we all might want.  
 
If, in contrast, we follow Žižek in understanding antagonism as being ‘within’ the system, education 
is impossible. Education fails because it ignores its own fundamental antagonism. Simultaneously, in 
the context of capitalist schooling, education fails because all the problems of contemporary 
education (systematic failure, reproduction of inequality, etc.) are inherent to education in itself.  
Education is impossible not because of external obstacles, but because it is part of the very notion of 
education never to completely reach its goal. In the conditions under which education would finally 
be possible, it would no longer be needed. It is because education ultimately fails—in the sense that 
there will always be a gap preventing us from a direct immersion in our surroundings—that it is 
finally necessary. Education is thus simultaneously impossible and necessary. It is the necessary 
condition for someone to become part of a certain culture or society, but it never completely 
succeeds because, as explored before, the lack that is the subject is the lack of culture. The challenge 
in this perspective is precisely to engage with the impossibility of education, not as a negative 
deadlock, but as the condition of possibility of any alternative education (or politics).  Bringing 
populism into educational settings would then reproduce the same ideological game that it claims to 
challenge.   
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